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WHY THE USPTO SHOULD ADOPT
A DEFERRED PATENT EXAMINATION SYSTEM
David P. Irimies1
ABSTRACT
To date, the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO)
has addressed its two main issues - backlog and stretching
pendency times - primarily by throwing resources at them. This
approach has failed. This paper explores how the adoption of a
deferred examination system for all non-provisional U.S. patent
applications - similar to current Patent Cooperation Treaty practice
- would help the USPTO alleviate these issues. To that end, this
paper proposes a deferral system, demonstrates how deferred
examination could be done at the USPTO as part of its normal
practice of examining patent applications, and discusses policy
considerations that both support and are antagonistic to such a
proposal. First, the proposed deferral system would help the
USPTO perform examinations correctly the first time by enabling
more complete prior art searches and office actions; it is worth
noting that this could be done without hiring more examiners.
Secondly, this system would reduce transaction costs, facilitate
innovation and trade, and harmonize our patent laws with the rest
of the world. More generally, and perhaps more importantly, a
deferred system would substantially conserve USPTO resources,
increase the quality of issued patents, and increase the public's
confidence in our patent system. Potential concerns such as lack
of notice, submarining of patents, shifting the cost burden to patent
challengers, and U.S. labor issues are either directly addressed
with the proposed deferred examination system or are more
directly related to other issues, such as damages and outdated
litigation laws.
1. U.S. Patent Agent #58900; J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron
School of Law, December 2010; B.S. Computer Engineering, Purdue
University. I thank my family for their unending support and encouragement of
me throughout my law school and professional careers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 12, 2009, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) hosted a roundtable discussion ("Roundtable") on
the topic of deferred examination. This Roundtable discussed the
advantages and disadvantages of the USPTO adopting deferred
examination; its national impact on applicants, the public,
competitors, and on the USPTO's pendency and workload; and its
international impact. This paper examines whether the USPTO
should conduct deferred examination on all non-provisional U.S.
patent applications, similar to current Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) practice. This paper provides a proposed deferral system,
demonstrates how deferred examination could be done at the
USPTO as part of its normal practice of examining patent
applications, and discusses policy considerations associated with
such an examination system. This paper does not cover
tangentially related ideas that former USPTO Director Jon Dudas
put forth, which would allow applicants up to five years to claim
priority on a provisional application and allow applicants the
ability to obtain an extension of 14 months to respond to a notice
to file missing parts before the USPTO can examine an
application.3
A. Current State of USPTO and PCT practices
The USPTO processes both patent and trademark applications
and has largely been a fee-funded agency for the past twenty
years.4 The USPTO currently employs more than 9,000 people,
2. See USPTO to Host Roundtable on Deferred Examination,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/2009febO9.htm (last visited August
12, 2009).
3. Questions and Answers for the Record, Page 4. United States Patent and
Trademark Office Oversight Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (February 27,
2008), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/dudas.ltr.pdf.
4. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION REGARDING THE U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2 (December 19, 2008) (hereinafter U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Recommendations), available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/volunteers/
committees/ipc/documents/USPTO_PatentProject_ 10.24.08.pdf
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two-thirds of whom are examiners; the majority of those
examiners have less than three years of examining experience.'
Some key USPTO operating statistics, when compared to similar
statistics from ten years ago, demonstrate the ever-increasing
problems of application backlog and stretching pendency times,
despite a swell in expenditures. These statistics show a budget that
has drastically increased from $560 million to a near four-fold
increase of over $2 billion.6 In addition, the examiner corps has
more than doubled, having increased from 2,600 examiners to
6,000 examiners, and the number of new applications has risen
from 240,000 new applications filed ten years ago to 464,000
applications filed today. During this time, the application backlog
has grown from 480,000 to over 1,200,000, and the average
pendency time amongst all art units has grown from 24 to 32
months.7 In the next few years, these numbers are likely to rise:
this new application rate could swell to over 600,000 per year,
largely due to an influx of applicants from China and India.' This,
in general, is due to foreign corporations understanding the
commercial need to have a corresponding American patent to their
home country patent."l Likewise, the backlog may rise, as many of
the examiners hired over the recent years have already resigned,
leaving examiners with no experience to replace them."
In 2002, Mr. Dudas proposed an 18-month deferred examination
system as a way to deal with the backlog. In response, some of the
influential trade associations of the patent bar pushed back
strongly, and demanded that the USPTO receive full funding and
5. Id. at 3, 8.
6. USPTO, FISCAL YEAR 2009 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/comp/budg/fy09pbr.pdf.
7. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 3, 8;
Katznelson, Ron D., Examination-On-Request - A Deferred Examination
Proposal for the U.S. Patent Office 3, (May 29, 2009) (hereinafter Katznelson
Recommendations) available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/
opla/comments/deferredcomments/rkatznelson.pdf.
8. Wegner, Harold, Deferred Examination: A Realistic Solution to Deal with
a 1.2 Million Patent Application Backlog vs. Hiring Thousands of Examiners,
October 2, 2008 (hereinafter Wegner Recommendations), at 33.
9. Id. at 7, 10.
10. Id. at 16.
11. Id. at6.
357
3
Irimies: Why the USPTO Should Adopt a Deferred Patent Examination System
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J ART, TECH & IP LAW
use those funds to hire as many examiners as necessary to fill the
backlog. 12  Consistent with these complaints, the USPTO has
addressed its two main issues - backlog and stretching pendency
times - primarily by throwing resources at them. 3 These trade
associations were not receptive to alternative, more creative
solutions, like the deferred PCT-like practice proposed herein. 4
The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), one of the
key trade associations in IP matters, resisted alternative solutions
because the IPO felt such alternatives would harm the interests of
patent owners and would fail to address the backlog issue. 5 In
addition, the IPO felt that throwing resources at the backlog and
stretching pendency times would be the most effective course of
action. 6 As the statistics above demonstrate, this approach has
failed.
An overview of the salient parts of PCT practice is in order.
Nations that are signatories to the PCT "constitute a Union for
cooperation in the filing, searching, and examination of
applications for the protection of inventions."' 7 First, an inventor
(applicant) within a PCT-member country files their local patent
application to establish the application's priority date.' Then, the
12. Id. at 3-5.
13. And in a secondary fashion by useful, yet underutilized, pilot programs
such as the First Action Interview pilot and Accelerated Examination. In the
First Action Interview pilot, a preliminary office action is issued, then a face-to-
face interview between the examiner and prosecution attorney takes place to
work out the prosecution issues, and then an official first office action is issued.
In Accelerated Examination, the entire prosecution lifecycle takes place over the
course of twelve months, but the quid pro quo is that applicants submit a
detailed search report, amongst other requirements. Andrew Hirshfeld, Acting
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, presentation at the
University of Akron class: IP Policy and Politics, (Mar. 17, 2009).
14. See e.g. Letter from Marc S. Adler, President, Intellectual Property
Owners Assoc., to Hon. Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property, (May 3, 2006), at 2, 5 (available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-claims/ipo.pdf).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 1., available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/
en/texts/articles/a 1 .htm# 1.
18. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, Chapter I (International Application and
International Search) and Chapter II (International Preliminary Examination).
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applicant files a single PCT application, up to twelve months from
the priority date, that, by default, designates all PCT member
countries.19 Sixteen months from the priority date, an international
search report (ISR) of prior art and a written opinion of its impact
are provided to the applicant from the patent office performing that
search (international search authority/ISA).20 Using the ISR, the
applicant can then decide whether the claims are supported by the
written description and prior art limitations. Eighteen months
from the priority date, the PCT application is published.21 Usually
at twenty-two months from the priority date, the applicant can
choose to file a demand to obtain a preliminary examination of
patentability, or the applicant can choose to wait until thirty
months from the priority date to enter the national stage, at which
point he must elect which PCT member countries he wishes to
seek patentability in, begin the substantive examination process
and pay the requisite fees.22
Compare this thirty-month window of beginning substantive
examination under the PCT/deferred examination model to the
USPTO's current model: currently, it takes anywhere from twenty
to forty-five months, depending on the art unit, for the USPTO to
begin substantive examination, via a first office action, on a non-
provisional application.23  Therefore, a USPTO implemented
deferred examination system would not be incompatible with the
PCT system, since PCT applicants can wait up to thirty months
before entering the national stage for deferred examination.
B. USPTO Patent Quality and the Need for a Deferral System
The quality of examinations is directly proportional to the
quality of the issued patent, and thus, the confidence of a nation's
patent system to its citizens and businesses. 4  Although the
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. How Long Do I Wait for a First Office Action, PATENTLY-O, Nov. 15,
2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/1 1/how-long-do-i-w.html.
24. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 5.
359
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USPTO has asserted that the quality of its issued patents is
256improving," some stakeholders would dispute that assertion. 6 For
example, the IPO coordinated a survey amongst its corporate
members about U.S. patent quality: over half of those surveyed
indicated that such quality was lacking, and over three-quarters of
those surveyed believe that the state of such quality would remain
stagnant, or even worsen, in the coming years. 7 Meanwhile, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce advocates that in order to achieve true
U.S. patent quality, examination should be performed "right the
first time" via more comprehensive prior art searches and more
complete office actions. 8
Under the current U.S. patent examination system, assessing the
true scope of prior art, which requires examiners to perform
comprehensive prior art searches, is difficult. 9 This is especially
so in light of the anticipation standards of 35 U.S.C. §102(a) and
(b), 3° and particularly in instances where the relevant prior art must
25. Some USPTO quality metrics include an allowance error rate from 5.3%
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 to 3.7% in FY'08; an in-compliance rate (percent of
office actions without error) from 82% in FY'04 to 92% in FY'08; and a Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmance-on-patentability rate from 62%
in FY'06 to 77% in FY'09. See Hirshfeld, supra note 13.
26. During the Roundtable, participant Gordon Arnold of the American Bar
Association argued that the examiner corps' failure - due to English being a
second language to some examiners and poor quality office actions amongst the
entire examiner corps - has led to a lack of patent quality. See Roundtable
Webcast from Townhall Meeting on Deferred Examination, available at
https://uspto.connectsolutions.com/p91717658 (last visited April 2, 2009)
(hereinafter Roundtable webcast).
27. Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 11 th Cong., 1 st Sess. 7(2009)(testimony of David J. Kappos, Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO and
former VP and Assistant General Counsel IP Law and Strategy, IBM
Corporation).
28. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 3.
29. See Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 21, 49.
30. The examiner must consider whether the subject matter of the application
was known or used by others in the U.S., or patented or publicized by others
anywhere before the date of the invention. 35 U.S.C. §102(a) (2006).
Additionally, the examiner must consider whether the subject matter was
patented or publicized by anyone at any place, including the inventor, or was in
public use or on sale by anyone more than one year before the effective filing
date of the application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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be translated. In China, for example, a complete understanding of
the foreign prior art in China would require examiners to translate
the 700,000 Chinese applications published each year that do not
have a foreign counterpart and, therefore, no related English
language application.31
Even if a newly discovered piece of prior art is discovered
during prosecution, examiners will often refuse to admit
amendments or allow new evidence in an effort to meet their
production quotas (known as "beans").32 To account for this newly
discovered prior art, applications must often file a Request for
Continued Examination (RCE).33 This often results in a churning
of applications and only increases the USPTO application backlog.
To reduce this backlog, the USPTO must consider more foreign,
material prior art earlier in the prosecution process and should
eliminate continuing applications practice. " The U.S. is the only
country to have RCEs as part of its normal prosecution practice.35
The elimination of RCEs and other continuing applications will
compel prompt presentation of evidence and claims.36
Three years ago, the USPTO received a flood of over 400,000
national phase patent applications via PCT.37 Each of these
applications contained a search report of relevant prior art that the
USPTO examiners can, and often do, wholly ignore.38 Many of
these applications, therefore, forced the USPTO to perform
duplicative prior art searches as well as repetitive anticipation and
obviousness analyses. This wasted USPTO resources and
increased pendency times. To make matters worse, the current
Patent Reform Act of 2009 includes a Search and Examination
Functions provision that would preclude the USPTO from having
any entity other than a U.S. government (USPTO) employee
examine patent applications and conduct prior art searches.39 This,
31. See Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 21, 49.
32. STEVEN W. LUNDBERG & STEPHEN C. DURANT, ELECTRONICS AND
SOFTWARE PATENTS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.03 (2000).
33. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 52, 5 8-60.
34. Id. at 56, 61.
35. Id. at 62.
36. Id. at 56, 61.
37. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4 at 10.
38. Id.
39. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S.515(k)(1-2), "SEARCH AND
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too, will only serve to waste USPTO resources and increase the
backlog.
To date, the USPTO has attempted to solve these problems by
throwing resources at them. The USPTO projects that, under its
current policies, the backlog will start to decrease only by 2013, at
best.4" On the contrary, Ron Katznelson, one of the Roundtable's
core participants, demonstrated that the USPTO's patent
application disposal capability consistently fails to withstand the
current filing rates of applications.4 His metric for a stable versus
unstable examination system is a queue-loading ratio (QLR),
which measures the ratio of the number of applications filed over
the number of disposed applications. 42 Ideally, the QLR would be
1, but as Mr. Katznelson shows, the USPTO's current QLR is
approximately 1.20, meaning an examination shortfall of 20%, and
an overall unstable examination system.4 3
Should it choose to adopt a deferral system, the USPTO, in one
conservative estimate, may well free itself of about 1 million
examiner-hours." In another estimate, under a three year deferral
system, there would be a 15-25% total savings in examination
workload due to a dropout of unexamined applications and claims
and a withdrawal of many original claims.45 In yet another
estimate, implementing deferred examination will eliminate, via no
follow-up examination requests, over 40% of projected
applications that otherwise would have to be examined each year.46
EXAMINATION FUNCTIONS," proposed amendment to 35 U.S.C. 131,
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl 11-515; see
also discussion infra Section VI(D).
40. See Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 3, 19 (Comparing
"UPR Applications Filed" with "UPR Disposals").
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. An additional problem with the status quo system is that the USPTO
has to waste its resources on all applications that come in because prior art
searches are done in parallel with examination. On the other side, the applicant
is effectively bound to proceed with examination because he has expended so
many resources to get the examination into the queue.
45. Id. at 3. Approximately half of this total savings would result from
unexamined applications.
46. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 34.
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II. THE PROPOSED DEFERRAL SYSTEM
A. General Sketch and Search Reports
One component of this proposed deferral system would be a
proposal for work-sharing among the USPTO, European Patent
Office (EPO), and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). These three
patent offices handle the majority of worldwide patent
applications.47 Other offices could be included as partners in this
work-sharing group, including the Chinese Patent Office. Each
office would rely on other partner offices' work in search and
examination-a full-faith and credit provision-to help reduce
backlog among all offices. In other words, a work-sharing system
would exist whereby one examiner would do the worldwide prior
art search and substantive examination work. The home office
would have to take into account foreign search and examination
reports from parallel proceedings. Although the home office
would not be able to overturn search and substantive examination
results, the home office would still hold the final say as to whether
the patent application should be allowed or denied.48 Such a
system ought to work for the USPTO, given that the USPTO has
the highest percentage of foreign-based applicants of any world
patent office.49 Factoring in the amount of U.S. applicants that file
abroad, it could very well be that over half of all world cases could
use this scheme." Even many groups that oppose the USPTO
adopting deferred examination agree that global patent office work
sharing would lead to more substantive patent law harmonization
and would produce more results from one office that could be
leveraged to more effectively exam applications.5
47. TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION,TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2007, 37
(2007), available at http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2007/activity.pdf.
48. For an alternative view, see FEDERAL TRADE COMMITTEES, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW
POLICY 8-10 (October 2003),available at http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/
cpreport.shtm.
49. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 74-75.
50. Id. at 75.
51. See, e.g. Brian P. Barret, Deferred Examination - a Sensible Solution to
363
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Sometimes, statutory prior art is not available on public
websites, and many documents originally exist only in non-English
languages. In these instances, it takes a considerable amount of
time for an English translation to become available. 2 Under this
system, the EPO, Chinese, and Japanese examiners could assess
the true state of non-English prior art, similar to multiple PCT
ISRs 3 Then, the USPTO examiners would be required to use
these search reports and respond to their relevance, and the
applicants would receive these reports in a timely fashion (they
would not be required to respond to their relevance). These search
reports would be sent to the applicant before the deferral deadline
(duration) to start examination and would be published either at
eighteen months from filing of the application or between eighteen
months and the end of the deferral period. 4 This would enable
applicants to get a preview and understanding of the technical
hurdles that lie ahead in achieving issuance. In sum, the deferral
period would give USPTO examiners the benefit of additional,
relevant information that comes with the passage of time, which
would result in a better, more substantive examination of patent
applications.5
This proposed deferral system is not dependent on hiring more
examiners, and is, therefore, not dependent on whether Congress
stops fee diversion. 6 Such a stop would likely result in an even
USPTO Troubles?(September 16, 2009) (hereinafter Eli Lilly
Recommendations), available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section
=Search&section=Papers 1 8&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileI
D=61192.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 50.
54. Steven Bennett & David Kappos, Inside Views: Deferred Examination:
A Solution Whose Time Has Come, Intellectual Property Watch, 4 (Mar. 12,
2009) (hereinafter IBM Recommendations) available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/03/12/
inside-views-deferred-examination-a-solution-whose-time-has-come/.
55. See id.
56. Fee diversion involves Congress reallocating USPTO user fees towards
other federal government programs. See Intellectual Property Owners
Association, Adequate Funding for the USPTO and Ending Fee
Diversion,http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/C
M/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=3360 (last visited March 25, 2009); and
Intellectual Property Owners Association, Ending Diversion and Ensuring that
364 [Vol. XX:2
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larger examiner corps.5 This proposed deferral system might not
solve all the backlog and pendency problems, but it would at least
be a start. The USPTO approach will have to be multi-pronged,
with an emphasis on increasing the capability of its examiner
workforce, retaining competent examiners, continuing to
implement its accelerated examination and peer-to-patent
programs and the adoption of applicant responsibility measures58,
implementing a fee-for-service model and a fee structure to
encourage best practices, ending continuation practices 59, and
adopting global patent office work sharing as part of a larger
deferred examination system.6"
In particular, IBM's proposal for deferred examination includes
several different deferral routes: first, an applicant would pay the
search fee, which would result in the publication of both the
application and search reports eighteen months from filing; and
second, both the search and substantive examination would be
deferred until after the application publishes. Such a system would
allow applicants to abandon the case based upon the search report
or when the applicant no longer wishes to pursue patent protection,
such as when the invention no longer has commercial potential.61
USPTO retains its User Fees, July 10, 2006, http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=2709&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm.
57. Harold Wegner, Remarks at the University of Akron IP Symposium,
Panel Discussion: Impact of Obama Administration on IP Policy (2009)
(hereinafter Wegner Remarks).
58. Such applicant responsibility measures could include capping the number
of independent claims, allowing examiners to clarify claims prior to searching,
requiring responses to written opinions prior to examination, and limiting
voluntary amendments. Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51, at 13.
59. See discussion supra Section I(B) and infra Section VI(A).
60. See generally Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51. The current
administration will have to prioritize these prongs, but one of them should be
adopting deferred examination. See Robert W. Fieseler, How President Obama
Can Restore Our Patent System, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Apr. 2009,
at 13.
61. IBM Recommendations, supra note 54, at 8.
365
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B. Duration of Deferral Period
One of the first specific questions that gets raised when
implementing this proposed deferral system is how long to allow
deferred examination. There is debate among scholars as to how
long to make the deferral period. The prevailing view is that
deferral should last for up to three years from the effective filing
date,62 but other scholars suggest that the deferral period should
last for up to five years.63 Regardless of which is adopted, the
applicant has the power to select the amount of months he chooses
to defer. 6' In other words, this system is beneficial because it
would allow applicants to choose when they want to exit deferral.6
To do so, an applicant would simply request examination by
paying the examination fee before the deferral period runs out.66
Such a rule also benefits the USPTO in that the majority of
examiners, who have less than three years of examining
experience, would gain important experience by working on
applications that precede the adoption of this proposed deferral
system.
Some scholars propose a three-year deferral system. A three-
year period would be compatible with the PCT timeline67 and
would lead the U.S. towards greater harmonization of substantive
and procedural patent law with the world. A three-year deferral
period would also be compatible with the JPO's three-year deferral
period, which would in turn lead to greater harmonization of
substantive and procedural patent law with a major patent office.68
Finally, a three-year deferral system would best balance USPTO's
workload shortages with its ever-increasing application pendency
times.69
Harold Wegner, a prominent IP scholar, proposes a five-year
62. See e.g. id.; Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7.
63. See e.g. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 36-38.
64. See Fieseler, supra note 60, at 12.
65. IBM Recommendations, supra note 54, at 1. Many applicants within
sectors with relatively shorter product cycles, such as software and IT, would
likely choose to end deferral sooner.
66. Id.
67. See discussion supra Section I(A).
68. See discussion infra Section VII.
69. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 12.
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deferral system to allow for the elimination of over 40% of
projected applications that would otherwise have to be examined
(via no follow-up examination requests). Once that happens, the
USPTO could shorten the deferral period to three years by its own
rulemaking mechanisms. 7' Another reason for having the deferral
period initially run for five years is that the biotech,
pharmaceutical, and chemical industries would benefit from a five-
year deferral system, as they rely on de facto deferred examination
to flesh out prior art, and these art units file more information
disclosure statements than other art units.71 Yet another reason to
have the deferral period run for five years is that new technologies
need time before they can reasonably be determined to be
commercially viable; if an invention becomes unmarketable, an
applicant would not need to risk wasting time and resources on
prosecuting an application.72  Perhaps Mr. Wegner's most
compelling reason for adopting a five-year initial deferral period is
that it would allow the USPTO to resolve its 1.2 million current
application backlog. As mentioned, the USPTO could then
shorten the deferral period by art unit/industry once the current
backlog is removed.73
The maximum length of deferral should initially be set to five
years because it would provide applicants with a reasonable
amount of time to determine the commercial viability of most
technologies and may eliminate over 40% of such projected
applications that would otherwise have to be examined via no
follow-up examination requests. This would allow the USPTO to
resolve its 1.2 million application backlog; after the USPTO
application backlog subsides, the USPTO could then shorten the
maximum deferral period to 3 years by its own rulemaking
mechanisms.
C. Third Party, On-Demand Examination
The proposed deferral system would also include a rule
70. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 36-38.
71. Id. at 39-41.
72. Id. at 46.
73. See id. at 71, 88.
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permitting third parties, such as competitors to the applicant, to
demand earlier examination of any application by paying a fee. 74
Those who do not want to wait until the end of the deferral period
will be able to request early examination, as by that point the
backlog will have been reduced.7' Third parties can anonymously
request a search and/or examination of a published application
after submitting a declaration, per 37 C.F.R. §10.18, paying fees,
and, if desired, submit prior art at that time, per 37 C.F.R. § 1.99.76
Should such a rule be adopted, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
recommends that examiners be given reduced credits in meeting
their production quotas ("beans"7 7) for such work that recognizes
search results and other work done by first filing offices, in order
to remove disincentives for examiners to speed up the prosecution
process.78 This recommendation matches a current USPTO Joint
Labor-Management Task Force proposal to revamp the beans
system, which includes decreasing credits for examining RCEs.79
Such a proposed deferral system would speed up the prosecution
process, something that major patent stakeholders could subscribe
to." Theoretically, this proposed deferral system would also speed
74. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 20; IBM
Recommendations, supra note 54, at 1. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
recommends that third parties be allowed to initiate examination at any time in
the prosecution process, however the IBM analysis of third parties being
allowed to initiate examination eighteen months from filing is more in line with
current USPTO practice.
75. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 84.
76. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 15.
77. STEVEN W. LUNDBERG & STEPHEN C. DURANT, ELECTRONICS AND
SOFTWARE PATENTS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.03 (2000).
78. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 10-
11; Feisler, supra note 60, at 12. However, see infra Section VI(d) for a
discussion on the hurdles of doing this. Specifically, such a change in the
production system would have to be negotiated between the USPTO and the
examiners' union. Feisler, supra note 60, at 12.
79. Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Joint Labor-Management Task Force
Proposes Significant Changes to Examiner Count System, (Sep. 30, 2009),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comi/speeches/09-19.htm.
80. The largest patent holders, such as IBM, could favor deferred
examination that speeds up the prosecution process. See Liza Porteus Viana, US
Debates Patent Exam Deferrals Patent Reform Bill Expected This Year,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/02/13/us-debates-patent-exam-deferrals-patent-reform-
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up the processing of non-deferred applicants, as fewer applications
will be in the examination queue.81
Additionally, this proposed deferral system would provide for
early publication of deferred applications to serve as notice to the
public and enforcement of the written description and enablement
requirements. When the USPTO grants the deferral request, it
would eventually make the content of the application and search
report available to the public. This benefits the public in that they
will have an easier time finding relevant prior art in their field and
in understanding the technical challenges associated with issuing
current applications.83
D. Intervening Rights to Third Parties
Deferred examination has to address potential prejudices and
uncertainty towards competitors of the applicant. One way to
reduce concerns of uncertainty and prejudice towards competitors
in adopting a deferred system is to grant intervening rights to any
third party that, in good faith, commercializes the same invention
during the deferral period.84  More specifically, only those
qualified third parties would have a legal, intervening right to
practice that same, later-claimed invention.
bill-expected-this-year/.
81. See IBM Recommendations, supra note 54, at 6.
82. U.S. patent law requires that the application contain a written description
of the invention being claimed; in other words, the application has to convey to
the person of ordinary skill in that art what it is being claimed. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
It also requires that the application enables a person of ordinary skill in that art
to make and use that invention; in other words, the application has to provide a
method of making and using the invention possible, without undue
experimentation. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) will
soon address in an en banc rehearing whether 35 U.S.C. §112, paragraph 1
contains a written description requirement, separate from an enablement
requirement. See Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly, No. 2008-1248, 2009 WL 5874322
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2009).
83. See IBM Recommendations, supra note 54, at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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E. Fee Schedule
The USPTO should also adopt a tiered payment system to defer
at least some of the search and examination fees until the applicant
requests examination - essentially, a "pay as you go" fee
schedule.86 This pay as you go fee schedule has multiple benefits,
for both applicants and the USPTO. Applicants who decide to
abandon the application obtain an overall cost savings since they
will not have to pay for search and examination services never
rendered. Likewise, this would allow the USPTO to allocate its
resources towards more relevant, pending applications.87 Another
benefit is that with a low filing fee, the USPTO can more easily
suggest imposition of a high examination fee at the end of the
deferral period, resulting in many applications with low net market
value being abandoned.88 The USPTO should also consider
reducing post-allowance and post-issuance fees on the applicant if
he were to adopt deferred examination.
The USPTO should also consider refunding excess claims and
excess pages fees, and should also refund search fees if that search
predated the first action on the merits.89 If the USPTO were to
refund the search fee, the USPTO would need to and likely could
balance the burden of lost, albeit small, revenue with the benefits
of additional claim dropouts and saved man-hours." The USPTO
would also need to consider the reality that many third-party
requesters are knowledgeable in that art area and have a vested
interest in producing relevant search results.9'
F. Extension of Patent Term Only Due to USPTO Delays
No extension of patent term should be made merely for the act
of deferring examination. Such an extension would extend the
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 55.
89. Id.; see also Changes To Implement the Patent Search Fee Refund
Provisions of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 71 Fed Reg. 12281,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71frl2281.pdf.
90. See Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 29.
91. Id.
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monopoly of the patent owner, without a proportionate benefit to
the public. Some art areas, such as pharmaceuticals and biotech,
would likely support deferred examination if the patent term, and
thus their large R&D investment, were not adversely adjusted.
These particular industries have an urgency to file applications
quickly, given the competitiveness of these industries.92 However,
the Food and Drug Administration and other agencies heavily
regulate the majority of the products in these industries; therefore,
there really is little to no need for these industries to have hastily
issued applications.93 Moreover, the USPTO art unit that examines
such applications typically has one of the longest pendency rates.94
Extensions should be determined as they are under the current
system. Extensions to a patent's term should only take place for
those delays caused by the USPTO after the applicant has
requested examination and paid the examination fee.95 Any delay
in issuance due to the applicant's deferral would result in a
subtraction of patent term extension credit, per 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(b).96
III. APPLICATIONS UNDER THE PROPOSED DEFERRAL
SYSTEM
A. New Applications
For new applications filed on or after the effective date of the
deferred examination system, the applicant must defer
examination; nonetheless, the applicant can choose the amount of
time he wishes to defer examination of his application, for up to
92. Posting of Biotech Atty to Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 44: Deferred
Examination, PATENTLY-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/06/patently-
o-bi-5.html (Jun 17, 2008, 10:27 EDT).
93. Id.
94. See Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 12.
95. Letter from Robert J. Yarbrough, Chairman, Penn. Intellectual Property
Forum, to Robert W. Bahr, Commissioner for Patents, USPTO (Feb. 25, 2009)
available at http://yarbroughlaw.com/PA%201P%2OForum/PA%201P%20
Forum%20advocacy/Deferred%2Oexamination/comments%20to%20deferred%
20examination%20proposal.htm.
96. Id.
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five years. The applicant can execute and file with the USPTO a
Declaration and Non-Exclusive Limited Power of Attorney, which
designates any third-party to act on the Applicant's behalf as
Applicant's authorized agent for perfecting (completing) the patent
application per 35 U.S.C. § 11 (a).97 Applicants who do not file a
request for examination within the maximum deferral period
would have their application abandoned by operation of law." The
application would not be examined, and the applicant would lose
any benefit of an earlier filing date.99 Some argue that it would not
be productive to have the patent term run during the deferral
period-without any tolling nor extension provision, as the current
optional deferred system is not being used because of this
inflexibility. 0  However, the patent term should run during
deferral, and extensions to a patent's term should only take place
for those delays caused by the USPTO after the applicant has
requested examination and paid the examination fee. Any other
circumstance would extend the monopoly of the patent owner
without any additional quidpro quo benefit to the public.
Applications subject to a secrecy election, per 35 U.S.C.
§122(b)(2)(B), would not be allowed to be deferred and would be
examined according to the status quo examination track."'
B. Current Pending Applications
For current, pending applications filed before the effective date
of deferred examination, the applicant can choose to defer his
application if there has been no first office action on the merits, the
application is not subject to a secrecy order under 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b)(2)(B), or the application has an effective filing date of less
than fifty-eight months before the effective date of deferred
97. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 15-16.
98. Id. at 15.
99. Id.
100. Roundtable panelist Hans Sauer of the Biotechnology Industry
Association (BIO) indicated that BIO members opportunistically used the
deferred system, and do not use the current optional system under 37 CFR
1.103(d) due to the forfeiture in patent term adjustment. Roundtable Webcast,
supra note 26.
101. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 15.
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examination. 11 2 For all such qualified, pending applications, the
USPTO would send a Refund Election Action to all such
applicants, requiring applicants to respond within sixty days and
elect either an examination deferral election, under which the
applicant would receive a refund of the Examination Fee13 or
continuation of the status quo examination track."4
If the applicant does not respond "within six months after [the]
action," the USPTO, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 133, will consider the
application abandoned. 5  This alone would result in more
abandoned applications and a smaller backlog, as a majority of
applications in the current backlog would qualify for deferred
examination. However, if all fees were already paid and the
application was already perfected, per 35 U.S.C. 111(a), the
USPTO would not be able to suspend examination of such
applications, per 35 U.S.C. §131.06
Alternatively, the USPTO could automatically defer
examination of current, pending applications until the end of each
application's deferral period. 7 In the context of this proposal,
examination could be deferred for up to five years beyond the
effective filing date.
IV. HOW TO CODIFY THE PROPOSED DEFERRAL SYSTEM
A deferred system could be effected in two ways: (1) the
USPTO could amend its rules, or (2) Congress could amend the
U.S. patent statute. Generally speaking, there would be less debate
and less delay if the USPTO just amended its rules. The problem
is that these amendments would likely be more substantive in
nature, as adopting deferred examination will have substantive
effects in examination of patent applications, and the USPTO
typically cannot unilaterally adopt substantive rules. Nonetheless,
102. See id. at 17.
103. The up to fifty-eight months pendency plus two months Refund
Election Action would make examination deferral in all cases be up to the
maximum proposed deferral period of five years after the application's effective
filing date. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 17, 22.
106. Id. at 22.
107. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 72.
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Mr. Kaztnelson asserts that no new legislation would be necessary
to implement deferred examination, and he instead proposes a
creative USPTO rule change on deferring excess-claim, search,
and examination fees."°8 He also asserts that the proposed deferral
system is within the clear intent and language of the patent statute,
such that there is no need for Chevron agency deference." 9 More
specifically, Mr. Katznelson argues that the USPTO has authority
under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) to adopt a deferral system, which is
supported by the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 41."' This
legislative history reveals that Congress specifically authorized the
USPTO, per the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, to
charge separately for user fee components."' A perfected
application requires the user fees to be paid, and the conditions of
these fees can be set by the USPTO Director under 35 U.S.C. §
11 l(a)(3). "2
Others feel that the USPTO has no statutory authority for such a
change, and Congress would need to debate the issue of deferred
examination and amend the patent statute."13
In this case, Congress would probably have to act by amending
the U.S. patent statute. 14 If this proposal of adopting deferred
examination was considered separately from other more
controversial patent reform proposals, such as damages and post-
grant opposition proceedings, the proposal may pass through
Congress with less debate and delay. 5
108. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 14.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 19-20.
112. Id. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809
(2005) amends 35 U.S.C. § 41 in a way that separates the application fee into
three components: a filing fee, search fee and examination fee. According to
Mr. Katznelson, this allows for separate payments or refunds of examination
and search fees, therefore the USPTO can implement separate refunds and
deferral procedures.
113. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 57.
114. See e.g. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) vacated by 2009
U.S. App. LEXIS 14611 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 2009).
115. Initial debates in the current patent reform bill centered around
damages. E.g. Statement of Herbert C. Wamsley, Executive Director,
Intellectual Property Owners Association, Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on "Patent Reform In The 11 th Congress: Legislation And Recent
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The current patent reform bill, also known as the Patent Reform
Act of 2009, does not include any provisions directed towards
deferred examinations. "6 There are several possible reasons for
the lack of deferred examination provisions in the current patent
reform bill. The most likely reason is that many of the energies of
the current patent reform bill have been focused on other, more
controversial provisions, such as post-grant opposition, damages,
and fee setting. Post-grant opposition has been a hot topic in the
patent reform proceedings, largely because of the schism it creates
between the pharmacy interest groups and the software interest
groups.17  The pharmacy groups generally oppose it, because
pharmaceuticals want strong patent protection and predictable
results, in the form of issued, unopposed patents, for their
substantial R&D investments." 8
Another possible reason for the lack of deferred examination
provisions in the current patent reform bill is that there are simply
more stakeholders in patent law reform than ever before. Twenty
years ago, there were fewer Congressional committees, less federal
agencies, and consensus on controversial pending bills was easier
to achieve. Today, however, there are more trade associations and
bar groups, more federal agencies, and more Congressional
committees involved in IP matters. Thus, important issues take
longer to resolve; this helps explain why Congress has failed to
pass patent reform on a number of occasions. Historically, IP
legislation has only been passed at crunch time (e.g., in the last
Court Decisions", Tuesday, March 10, 2009, Page 13, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-03-1OWamsleytestimony.pdf. Now, the
debates are more centered on post-grant opposition proceedings. Small
businesses are generally resisting such proceedings, as they would undermine
the presumption of an issued patent being valid and cause serial attacks on
patents. Many large technology companies seem to favor post-grant opposition
proceedings because it would strengthen their patent portfolio. Kristina
Peterson, Proposed Change in Patent Policy Pits Big Firms vs. Small, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2009.
116. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S.515, 11lth Cong. (2009) available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s 111-515.
117. See Univ. of Akron School of Law, Class Discussion: IP Policy and
Politics (Mar. 16, 2009) (hereinafter Class Discussion).
118. Id.
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couple weeks of the second and final session of Congress.)119 If
history holds true, then the patent reform act will likely not pass
until the end of calendar year 2010.
V. PROPOSED DEFERRAL SYSTEM - ADVANTAGES
A. Benefits for the Inventor and Assignees
A deferral system would benefit both the inventor (applicant)
and potential assignees (corporations). Applicants could defer
paying fees, which would save them money on those applications
they no longer decide to pursue. The applicant might decide to
terminate prosecution of an application for various reasons: it
might be because the invention is no longer commercially viable,
because of newly discovered prior art, or because the invention has
lost its significance and impact. The applicant would then be
allowed to defer key patenting decisions until both the
application's technical features and the market opportunity for the
invention are reasonably understood.12 °  In other words, an
applicant could decide whether to pursue key patenting milestones
based on available material data.
Generally speaking, across a variety of industries, by the time a
patent issues, its claims may be obsolete. Thus, resources can be
saved if those obsolete and commercially unviable claims are not
examined.12' Claim obsolescence is especially prevalent in
consumer products goods and in generic pharmaceuticals, given
their short product lifecycle"'2 In the end, the USPTO, or any
other adopting office, would have to review fewer applications.123
Another advantage for the applicant under a deferred
examination system is that the applicant would be able to defer
119. Id.
120. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 8.
121. Id. at 2, 5; Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51, at 3 (referring to
the current backlog and pendency times as "patents issuing on museum-ready
inventions").
122. Id. at 6-7.
123. Fieseler, supra note 60, at 12.
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and/or save user fees and prosecution costs. 124 Law firms and the
patent bar may be opposed to deferred examination for this reason,
as fewer patent applications would be prosecuted.125 But this view
is shortsighted: new opportunities will arise for law firms and the
patent bar. For example, patent counsel will be needed to review
the cited art, and its impact, from the search reports published and
issued to the applicant before examination. In addition, patent
counsel will be needed to provide strategic guidance to clients
during the deferral period, as clients will have to determine the
optimum times to initiate the search, examination, and/or
abandonment of a case, and whether to request accelerated
examination of a competitor's deferred application.'26
Deferred examination gives inventors the realistic opportunity to
craft the intended language and scope of their claims until the
appropriate circumstances present themselves, vis-ht-vis products
being put on the market by the applicant or his competitors.'27
Here, some people believe that corporations will bully competitors
by claiming to have more patents pending. 128  However, the
countervailing consideration is that corporations put forth
substantial, long-term R&D investments in their inventions, and so
it is also in their interest to perfect such inventions. According to
the chief IP counsel of Johnson & Johnson, for example, each of
its U.S. patents creates or saves seven and one-half jobs per year. 29
Over the past three years, Johnson & Johnson has invested over $6
million in R&D for each patent application and a total of $15
million for each issued patent.3 °
Finally, the USPTO can concentrate on applications that
124. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 8.
125. See IBMRecommendations, supra note 54, at 7.
126. Id. at7.
127. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4 at 20.
128. PTO Restructuring Could Increase Patent Pendency and Harm Quality,
PATENTLORE, June 3, 2002, http://www.patentlore.com/ptocomer/popa.htm.
This article is by a member of the Patent Office Professional Association, the
union of the USPTO patent examiners.
129. Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111 th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (2009). (testimony of Philip S. Johnson,
Chief IP Counsel, Johnson and Johnson, Inc., on behalf of the Coalition for 21st
Century Patent Reform).
130. Id.
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applicants consider important, as applicants are in the best position
to make such determinations.'31 Many corporations have fixed IP
budgets, and may be apt to file more applications if they knew that
some of their deferred applications would eventually not be
pursued, so that they would not have to incur additional
prosecution costs. 32  This is good public policy: deferred,
abandoned applications that are published would serve as prior art,
similar to a previously published, abandoned application, which is
available as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and § 102(b) as of
its publication date. Such prior art expands the public's
knowledge base and will defeat new applications that read on this
prior art.
B. Benefits for the USPTO
A deferral system would also benefit the USPTO, because it
would reduce its backlog, increase the capabilities of its
workforce, and allow it to issue more valid patents; this would, in
turn, increase the public's confidence in the USPTO. As shown in
the above USPTO operating statistics in Section 1(a) supra, a
doubling of examiner force and new applications have done
nothing to stem a 55% increase in backlog; theoretically, these
changes should have resulted in a decrease, or at the very least, a
no net change in backlog.
A deferred system will allow the plethora of inexperienced
USPTO examiners to obtain more needed technical and legal
training before they influence the course of patent applications.
Since the USPTO will be able to defer examination for incoming
applications for up to five years, this would enable the USPTO to
focus on reducing the active application backlog. "3 In the end,
there would be a net savings in examination workload, as the
USPTO would no longer have to examine claims that the applicant
131. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 20.
132. See Matt Osenga, PTO Roundtable Finds Support for Deferred
Examination, INVENTIVE STEPS, Feb. 17, 2009, http://inventivestep.net/2009/
02/17/pto-roundtable-finds-support-for-deferred-examination/.
133. Id.
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no longer needs and would not need to devote as much time to
processing continuing applications such as RCEs. 34
A deferred system would take full advantage of PCT search
results of material prior art, which would save the USPTO
substantial examination time and allow the USPTO to more
quickly and efficiently reduce its backlog.'35 Deferred examination
leads to better search reports and more relevant prior art from
interested third-parties with expertise in that art to build a
workable record of prosecution.'36 Deferred examination also
translates into higher quality examinations, as the USPTO could
focus its search and examinations on those pending applications
that encompass technologies that are of importance'37 and
examiners would have a more complete basis to examine
applications (e.g., more prior art). Finally, the deferred system
may help reverse the current reduction in new filings and incoming
fees to the USPTO. 138  The USPTO may gain revenues using a
more back-loaded patent maintenance fee structure, since
examination investments would only be made on those patents that
have a realistic chance of being renewed.'39 Those who oppose the
USPTO adopting deferred examination argue that it results in an
unacceptable loss of income, as approximately one-third of
USPTO revenues come from filing fees. 4 ' However, deferred
examination could actually result in an increase in application
filings, which would therefore generate greater income.14 For
example, India adopted deferred examination in 2003 and since
then, the number of patent application filings have tripled from
134. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 8.
135. See discussion in supra I(B) and II(A); see also U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4 at 10.
136. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4 at 20;
Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 8.
137. See Fieseler, supra note 60, at 12.; James Wang, Deferred Examination
Considered by US. Patent Office, OC Patent Lawyer (March 7th, 2009),
http://ocpatentlawyer.com/deferred-examination-considered-by-us-patent-
office/.
138. In Fiscal Year 2009, USPTO filings are down 1%. See Osenga, supra
note 132.
139. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 8.
140. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51, at 21, 29.
141. Id. at 24.
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12,000 applications to 36,000 applications. 4 2 India's lower front-
end fees have encouraged Indian inventors to apply.
In conclusion, the benefits that the USPTO would see from the
adoption of such a system are significant, as it would allow the
USPTO to increase patent office revenues and reduce its
backlogs. 143
C. Benefits for the Public
Such a deferred system would also benefit the public. There
would be less pendency time because an applicant normally would
not be able to obtain patent term adjustment credit.'44 In addition,
there would be less R&D costs, which are ultimately passed on to
the consumer, in designing around claims that currently issue
under the status quo system.'45 Also, this proposed deferral system
would serve one of the main goals of the patent system, which is
early dissemination of technological advances. This deferred
system is good public policy: deferred, abandoned applications
that are published will serve as prior art and expand the public's
knowledge base. The general public will have an easier time
finding relevant prior art in their field, and in understanding the
technical challenges associated with current applications.'46
Finally, this proposed deferral system would increase the quality
of issued patents, and therefore increase the public's confidence in
our patent system.
VI. PROPOSED DEFERRAL SYSTEM- ADDRESSING
POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES
There are reasons that a deferred examination system has not yet
been adopted at the USTPO. The USPTO has offered an optional,
non-adjustable patent term deferred system for non-provisional
142. Id. at 24-25.
143. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW
543 (3d ed. 2009).
144. Id. at 8, 29; see discussion supra Section 11(F).
145. Id.
146. See discussion supra Section II(C).
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U.S. applications, per 37 C.F.R. 1.103(d). However, since 2000,
only two hundred applicants have taken advantage of this deferred
option.'47 In other patent offices, such as the JPO, examination
fees are deferred and examination is optional, but in the U.S., the
fees to commence prosecution must be paid upfront, including an
additional $130 processing fee, per 37 CFR 1.17(i), to initiate
deferred examination. The JPO also allows applicants to defer
paying the request for examination fee for up to one year from
filing, which is another step in the right direction for a deferred
examination system.'48
Another shortcoming of the present deferred option is "inertia."
In Japan, the prior art search and examination is already deferred
upon submitting the application and no action is needed to start the
deferral; in the U.S., however, applicants need to take additional
action to start the deferral.149 In the U.S., an application filed under
the deferred option must be ready for publication, per 37 CFR
§ 1.211 (c), which involves payments of multiple fees. Moreover,
the applicant must choose the number of months to defer
examination, per 37 CFR 1.103(d). At the time of filing,
applicants often do not have enough data to make an informed
decision on the number of months to defer examination. The only
other deferred option in the U.S. is to file a petition under 37
C.F.R. § 1.103(a) for "good and sufficient cause" to defer for short
periods; however, this involves substantially more preparation
time and costs for applicants, as compared to the alternative of
filing an affirmative request.
There are also concerns that a deferred examination system
could lead to a lack of notice and unwarranted shift in the scope of
claims, may unfairly shift third-party burdens of on-demand
examination, increase submarining of patents and have U.S. labor
147. See Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable on Deferred
Examination for Patent Applications, 74 Fed. Reg. 4946-47(Jan. 28, 2009)
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/74fr4946.pdf;
Viana, supra note 80.
148. Japanese Patent Office Announces Deferred Fees for a Request for
Examination for Patent Applications, ONDA TECHNO.coM, Apr. 1, 2009,
http://www.ondatechno.com/English/ip/patent/report/2009040 1_2.html.
149. Deferred Examination: PTO to Hold Roundtable Discussion,
PATENTLY-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/01/deferred-examination-
pto-to-hold-roundtable-discussion.html (January 28, 2009 12:3 8 EST).
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ramifications. Each of these concerns is addressed below.
A. Lack of Notice and Claim-Shifting
Opponents of a deferred examination system argue that such a
system would not provide adequate notice to the public regarding
the metes and bounds of the invention. This is a moot argument,
given that the status quo system has a more than eighteen-month
delay in a first action on the merits. 5 These concerns will
continue to be addressed under the deferred system via the
specification disclosure and claim definitiveness requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 112. Additionally, current continuing application
practice raises such concerns of notice and late claiming. Those
opposing a deferred system should have the burden of proving that
there are more harmful net effects of public notice with this
proposed deferred examination system. 5'
There is a greater benefit that outweighs any public notice delay
in deferred applications: every deferred application causes all later
applications to move out of turn ahead in the examination queue,
resulting in earlier public notice for these other issued
applications. 52 The proposed system would also mitigate another
public harm; with such a system, applicants can reduce R&D
costs, and this savings would ultimately be passed onto the
consumer. 53  Under the status quo system, innovators have to
invest R&D in non-infringing solutions that design around claims
that, due to intervening prior art and/or the invention is no longer
commercially viable, never would have issued under a deferred
system. 154
Additionally, the specification in patent applications already
serves to apprise the public of any supported claims that would
later issue. 5  The disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112
paragraph 1 demand this: the specification must describe the
function in "full, clear, concise, and exact" terms. Moreover, any
150. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 24.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 20.
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late claiming concerns are generally moot, as the claims in such
applications must satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2, which
demands that the claims "particularly point out and distinctly
claim the subject matter" of the applicant's invention. The policy
behind this requirement of claim definiteness in 35 U.S.C. § 112 is
two-fold: to stake the boundaries of the inventor's property rights
and to provide the public with notice of what is proprietary and
what can be exploited.
156
Concerns about applicants abusing increased claim scope under
a deferred examination system are moot if anyone has legal,
intervening rights to practice the patented invention, so long as that
party's practice or preparations took place before the first addition
of a claim to cover that embodiment. 57 In other words, the first
user is free from infringing claims added after practice or
preparations for such use.' Publishing the applications upon the
request of deferral and a mechanism to force early examination by
third-parties also address these concerns.
Finally, these concerns persist in the current system: in
particular, continuing applications, such as continuation-in-parts
and RCEs, present significant difficulties. Continuation practice
already has introduced these harmful effects, along with
substantial delays and uncertainty, into patent law system. 159 In
addition, continuation practice depletes USPTO resources. 6 ' As a
result, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has proposed that the
USPTO get rid of RCEs, which only prolong examination and
create uncertainty on the metes and bounds of an invention.
Overall, continued applications have become increasingly more
common in modem USTPO practice, as the total number of
continuation applications, relative to the number of total
applications filed, has risen from 18.9% of applications in 1990 to
approximately 30% of applications in 2006.61 In particular, RCE
filings now represent almost 20% of the total applications filed, up
156. ADELMAN, supra note 143, at 511.
157. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 54.
158. Id. at 83.
159. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 65 (2004).
160. Id.
161. ADELMAN, supra note 143, at 536.
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from just 8% from ten years ago. 162
The argument that the proposed deferred system would
exacerbate late claiming should be disregarded, given that the
status quo already allows the same thing via continuing
applications. 63 Thus, continuation practice could be eliminated
under the deferred system, 6" and the quid pro quo of patents would
still be preserved, based upon 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 35 U.S.C.
§ 112. 165
B. Third-Party, On-Demand Examination Unfairly Shifts
Burdens
Under a deferred examination system, third parties such as
competitors to the applicant could demand an earlier examination
by paying a fee. 16 6  Opponents of third-party, on-demand
examination argue that this would shift an unfair burden onto
competitors to pay for starting an examination on somebody else's
application.16' However, third-party, on-demand examination
merely time-shifts a post-issuance demand - the competitor would
pay anyway to challenge an issued patent. Raising such challenges
earlier on in the prosecution process would actually benefit the
competitor, as the competitor would bound the scope of the
challenge and the challenges would cost less as compared to post-
issuance challenges (due to inflation and an undeniable future
increase in fees over time). Some may argue that applicants in the
current economic recession need issued patents more than ever to
raise capital, and so deferred examination would not be in their
best interests. 68 However, the countervailing consideration is that
162. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 5, 24.
163. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 27.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. An additional option would be to allow the Director to cancel any
official deferral. See Letter of Norman L. Balmer, President, Intellectual
Proprty Owners Assoc., to Hon. Bruce A Lehman, Commissioner of Patents &
Trademarks (December 4, 1998) available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/
Template.cfmn?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD
=3402.
167. Id.
168. See Donald Zuhn, Patent Office Hosts Roundtable on Deferred
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many companies would rather choose to defer costs and deeper
investment in products that may or may not have commercial
viability.1
69
C. Increased Submarining of Patents
Another potential concern is that the practice of submarining
patents would increase under a deferred, PCT-like system.
However, submarine patenting, a practice that delays issuance of
patents to surprise a mature industry, is a symptom of the status
quo continued application system.7 ' Submarining is also more an
issue because of the U.S.'s outdated laws concerning patent
litigation and patent damages.' Current litigation rules fail to
deter non-practicing entities (NPEs, also known as "patent trolls")
from filing frivolous suits, because NPEs do not face a counter-
threat of infringement claims since they do not make, use, nor sell
any allegedly infringing products. 72 Costs to NPEs to plead and
file suit are minimal, whereas defendants have to bear a
substantially greater cost in answering each element of the NPEs
pleading, which often times is a deluge of information relating to
development of defendants' products, customer demand for
defendants' products, etc.'73 Additionally, the current standard for
assessing damages is vague and risks being excessive relative to
the patent's contribution to a product.'74 Finally, the submarining
of secret patents, per 35 U.S.C. § 122, would be reduced, as secret
submarine patents under these applications would not be eligible
for deferral; therefore, they would move ahead in the exam queue
Examination: The Opposition, PATENTDOCS.ORG, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/02/patent-office-hosts-roundtable-on-deferred-
examination-the-opposition.html (describing Gordon Arnold's arguments on
behalf of the ABA).
169. See discussion supra Section V(a).
170. Lemley & Moore, supra note 159, at 65.
171. Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (2009)(testimony of Steven Appleton,
CEO Micron Technology, Inc.)
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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and be published earlier.'1 75
D. U.S. Labor Concerns
A deferred examination system also raises U.S. labor workforce
issues. The current Patent Reform Act of 2009 includes a Search
and Examination Functions provision, which forecloses the
possibility of work sharing substantive examination of patent
applications and prior art searches amongst national patent
offices. 76 One reason for this provision could be to preserve
national sovereignty, but that is a veiled and less significant
reason. 17 7 The main policy rationale for such a provision is that
labor unions are a major stakeholder in Democratic Party
politics. 178  Every non-management USPTO employee is
represented by one of three unions that want to keep the work here
at home: the Patent Office Professional Association (POPA,
representing patent examiners), the National Treasury Employees
Union (representing trademark examiners), and its separate chapter
(representing clerical staff).179
The answer here is simple: remove the above mentioned Search
and Examination Functions provision in the Patent Reform Act of
2009, but do not allow foreign offices to issue a final grant. 8°
Cosmetic solutions, such as providing the examiner one additional
hour of substantive examination, will not solve the backlog and
pendency issues while satisfying the labor unions. 81 The USPTO
175. See discussion supra Section 111(a) and Section 111(b); Katznelson
Recommendations, supra note 7, at 25.
176. However, the USPTO may revisit this provision following last winter's
Roundtable on work sharing. Roundtable on Work Sharing to be held
November 18, 74 Fed Reg. 54028-29 (October 21, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/opa/74fr54028.pdf.
177. See Class Discussion, supra note 117.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See discussion supra II(A); Wegner Remarks, supra note 57.
181. Todd Dickinson, at the 2009 University of Akron IP Symposium,
proposed that examiners be provided an additional hour for each application to
substantively examine it. Todd Dickinson, Remarks at the University of Akron
1P Symposium, Panel Discussion: Impact of Obama Administration on IP
Policy (2009). Harold Wenger, a peer panelist at the Symposium, argued that
an additional hour is essentially a churning, recurring, and never solved
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recently issued a notice reminding applicants that their selection of
certain ISAs with limited competency of the subject matter of the
application will result in delays in issuing the ISR. 82 This notice
reinforces USPTO's current stance that the work of particular ISAs
should not be recognized, a stance that runs counter to worldwide
harmonization and patent work sharing efforts.
U.S. labor concerns need to be balanced by worldly
considerations. First, many other patent offices, whose nations are
trading partners with the U.S., offer either deferred examination or
some form of a delayed examination process. 83 These nations
include Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, EPO, Germany,
India, JPO, Korea, Romania, Russia, and Thailand.'84 Second,
despite the U.S.'s artificial labor stances, worldviews and
approaches to solving problems are naturally gravitating towards a
PCT-like, deferred practice. As pointed out in one of the recent
hearings on patent reform, the nature of innovation has changed to
the point where "interconnected technologies have created an
environment that allows groups of people to innovate together
across enterprises and national boundaries."'' 5 Products entering
the market that satisfy consumer demands are becoming more
complex.'86 This market force has increasingly led to contributions
from more than a single inventor and involves the licensing of
hundreds of patented inventions - a term dubbed "collaborative
innovation."'8 7 This reflects an even greater need to vet out prior
problem, as approximately one-third of applications filed are continuing
applications. Wegner Remarks, supra note 57.
182. John Dole, Limited Competency of Certain International Searching
Authorities With Respect to Applications Filed in the USPTO (March 13,
2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotic
e/20090313_epo-ipau.pdf.
183. Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51, at 5.
184. Id. at 65-66.
185. Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111 th Cong., 1st Sess. 7(2009)(testimony of David J. Kappos, Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO and
former VP and Assistant General Counsel IP Law and Strategy, IBM
Corporation).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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art and perfect an invention before patent issuance. Nowadays,
perfection of an invention involves more interdisciplinary
approaches and backgrounds to solve these increasingly complex
issues. Translated to each of the international patent offices, this
collaborative innovation would involve interdisciplinary work
sharing to harmonize the worldwide patent law practice.
E. Other Concerns
Opponents of a deferred system also argue that it would increase
patent litigation (already an increased investment and stake by
applicant and/or competitor of associated product) and the number
of filed applications, since lower front-end fees would encourage
inventors to apply. At the same time, opponents point to a lack of
quantitative research that deferred examination correlates to patent
quality and they assert that, under this system, more applicants
would forego performing their own prior art search prior to
submission of the application.'88
However, some of these potential concerns have not been fully
vetted. For example, U.S. applicants currently are not required to
perform their own prior art search when applying for a U.S patent.
Regarding the potential increase in litigation for adopting a
deferred system, Roundtable participant Ken Patel, IP Counsel for
Procter and Gamble, shared that Procter and Gamble's experience
with deferred examination in Japan was not positive. This was due
to an increase in infringement actions on such deferred
examination patented-products that were on the Japanese market
for five-plus years.'89 However, early (i.e., standard eighteen
months from date of request) publication of deferred applications
and the enforcement of the existing written description and
enablement requirements, per 35 U.S.C. § 112, should address the
problems of lack of notice and claim scope shifting, because the
specification in deferred applications would serve to apprise the
public of the likely, supportable claims that would be crafted. 90
Increasing the maintenance fees (higher back-ended fees) with a
deferred examination procedure (lower front-end fees) would
188. See US. Chamber of Commerce Recommendations, supra note 4, at 21.
189. Roundtable Webcast, supra note 26.
190. See discussion supra Section VI(A).
388 [Vol. XX:2
34
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/5
2010] USPTO:DEFERRED EXAMINATION SYSTEM 389
curtail the submarining of patents by NPEs, because such a fee
structure would encourage applicants to abandon those
applications having a low commercial value. 9'
Others have questioned whether the evidence suggests that
deferred examination alone solves a patent office's pendency and
backlog issues. The USPTO, with an average pendency time,
amongst all art units, of 32 months, does not have deferred
examination.192 The EPO and JPO, patent offices that have
deferred examination, have average pendency times, amongst all
art units, of 44 and 32 months, respectively. 93 The Canadian
patent office, which has deferred examination, has an average
pendency time amongst its art units between 20 (mechanical) and
33 (electrical and biotech) months. 9 4 These numbers suggest that
patent offices worldwide-with and without deferred
examination-are struggling with their own backlog and pendency
issues.'95 However, when examining the operating statistics in
greater detail, international offices that have adopted deferred
examination have shown convincing improvement.
VII. INTERNATIONAL PATENT OFFICE EXPERIENCES
WITH DEFERRED EXAMINATION
The EPO, which utilizes an eighteen to twenty-four month
deferral system, went from approximately eleven claims in an
application in 1988 to seventeen in 1999 with a stable 90%
examination rate (10% application dropout rate).'96 Examination
rate is the percentage of applications that are ultimately examined,
after amended, withdrawn, and abandoned claims/applications are
taken into consideration.197
The JPO, which originally used a seven-year deferral system,
saw its average claim number in an application rise from three in
191. See Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 55.
192. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 3, 7.
193. Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51, at 9.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 10.
196. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 10; Eli Lilly
Recommendations, supra note 51, at 6.
197. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 10.
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1988 to seven in 1999: this resulted in a 15% increase in the
examination rate, from 45% to 60% (meaning a 40% application
dropout rate).198 Today, the JPO uses a three-year deferral system,
and statistics indicate that the JPO averages approximately eight
claims per application and has a 70% examination rate (30%
application dropout rate).19 9 When the JPO transitioned from a
seven to a three-year deferral system in 2005, the number of filings
decreased from 427,000 in 2005 to 396,000 in 2007, yet during
that time, the rate of examination requests stayed steady at 95% of
total filings. °0 Overall, from 2000 to 2007, there were over 40,000
less filings, as only 60% of filings had examination requests.
However, in that same time period, over 100,000 more
examination requests took place. 2 1' These statistics provide
evidence that a deferred examination system more efficiently
solves a major patent office's backlog.
The search report impacts patentability of the claims and the
abandonment rate of a patent office. The search report leads to
substantial abandonment prior to examination across a wide
variety of technology clusters: in the EPO, there was a two to eight
percent abandonment rate pre-search report, and this rises to
between nine and fifteen percent post-search report.2 2 Given this
abandonment rate, there are projections that the claim dropout rate
would equal twenty percent at the USPTO.20 3 In total, the results
and success seen in other countries that have adopted a deferred
examination system of some type provide strong evidence of the
fact that such a system will positively impact the USPTO backlog.
VIII.CONCLUSION
To date, the USPTO has attempted to solve its many problems
by merely throwing resources, in the form of increased budgets
and more workers, at them. Yet, these problems have not been
fixed. Although the President of POPA argues that the recent
198. Id.
199. Id.; Eli Lilly Recommendations, supra note 51, at 6.
200. Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8, at 91.
201. Id.
202. Katznelson Recommendations, supra note 7, at 11-12.
203. Id. at 14.
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hiring surges need more time to take effect before the USPTO
adopts deferred examination,2° sufficient time has passed and the
hiring surges have yet to have a positive effect on the problem.0 5
If the USPTO were to implement a deferred examination
practice in a manner similar to the proposed deferral system
presented in this paper, progress can be achieved in reducing
transaction costs, facilitating innovation and trade, and
harmonizing our patent laws with those of the rest of the world." 6
Flexible deferral of examination, at a maximum of five years, will
allow more previously undiscovered prior art from the date of
filing to become available to examiners over time. Applicants can
then decide which applications are important, which would allow
the USPTO to focus on the most important pending applications.2 7
In addition, a deferred system would enhance the technical and
legal capabilities of the USPTO examiner corps while substantially
saving USPTO resources, increasing the quality of issued patents,
increasing public confidence in our patent system, directly and
positively addressing the backlog and pendency issues, and
providing applicants and assignees with the opportunity to defer
costs and perfect their inventions. Any potential concerns about
this proposed deferred examination system are either directly
addressed by the proposed system or are more directly related to
other non-related issues such as damages and outdated litigation
laws.
204. Zuhn, supra note 168.
205. See generally Wegner Recommendations, supra note 8.
206. Other patent offices, such as the Japanese Patent Office, and Canadian
Patent Office, enable applicants to defer examination up to three years from the
date of filing. See Osenga, supra note 132.
207. IBM Recommendations, supra note 54, at 1.
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